Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
Summer 1999

Delegation and the Constitution
Gary S. Lawson
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gary S. Lawson, Delegation and the Constitution , in 22 Regulation 23 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/2574

This Article is brought to you for free and open access
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. For more information, please contact
lawlessa@bu.edu.

INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

The nondelegation principle is there to
be found, by those who care to look

Delegation and
the Constitution

B y G a ry L aw s o n

I

n 1690, john locke wrote that legislators “can
have no power to transfer their authority of making laws
and place it in other hands.” A century later, in 1789, the
federal Constitution provided that “all legislative Powers

herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” A little more than a hundred years later, in 1892, the
Supreme Court declared in Field v. Clark: “That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”
In 1989, nearly a century after Field v. Clark, the Supreme
their handiwork. For example, James Landis, one of the
Court in Mistretta v. United States upheld an essentially
principal intellectual figures of the New Deal, wrote in 1938
unconstrained grant of power enabling an administrative
that the administrative state “springs from the inadequacy
agency to set guidelines for federal criminal sentences,
of a simple tripartite form of government to deal with modoffering the stark observation that “our jurisprudence has
ern problems.” Modern government, concluded Landis,
been driven by a practical understanding that in our
“vests the necessary powers with the administrative authorincreasingly complex society, replete with ever changing
ity it creates, not too greatly concerned with the extent to
and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot
which such action does violence to the traditional tripartite
do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad
theory of governmental organization.” In other words, if
general directives.”
the needs of a modern bureaucracy come into conflict with
Mistretta’s pronouncement accurately summarizes
the Constitution, too bad for the Constitution.
the modern Court’s abject retreat from the principles that
Landis’s candid comments still ring true: No one serihad been expressed by Locke, the American Constituously doubts the outcome of a showdown, in any authortion, and the Supreme Court itself over three centuries. It
itative forum, between the Constitution and the modern
is today routine for administrative agencies to make law
state. Quite simply, the nation has chosen administrative
under general grants of authority that essentially instruct
governance over a Constitution that was designed prethe agencies to go forth and do good.
cisely to prevent any such outcome.
Many of the architects of the modern administrative
THE PROPOSITIONS ANALYZED HERE
state were well aware of the constitutional implications of
it would take a better philosopher than i to
show that as a matter of normative political theory the
Gary Lawson is professor of law at Northwestern University School of Law.
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legislative, executive, and judicial powers in three distinct
institutions with different constituencies and tenures. It
contains provisions about such matters as the formalities
of legislation, the making of treaties, the appointment of
unelected government officials, and the impeachment of
executive and judicial officers. But there is no provision
that expressly forbids the delegation of legislative power.
Indeed, unlike some contemporaneous state constitutions, the federal Constitution does not even contain a
residual “separation of powers” clause. The words “delegation” and “separation of powers” appear nowhere in the
Constitution.
The absence of such clauses is often taken as an
argument against a strong nondelegation principle;
even some of the nondelegation
doctrine’s most articulate champions seem bothered by the
absence of a nondelegation proThe search for a nondelegation clause is fundavision. But the search for a nondelegation clause is fundamenmentally misguided. The proper inquiry is whether
tally misguided because the
the Constitution affirmatively grants power to a
federal government is a government of limited and enumerated
particular institution of the federal government.
powers. The proper inquiry is
whether the Constitution affirmatively grants power to a particular
institution of the federal government
ond proposition, it is close to an article of faith among
to perform the act in question.
academics and judges that even if a nondelegation
The Constitution nowhere grants power to “the fedprinciple exists in theory, there is no practicable way
eral government” as a unitary entity. Instead, it grants
to apply it. That consensus is broad enough to include
specific powers to the specific institutions that collecJustice Scalia, who is generally one of the foremost
tively compose the federal government. Each discrete
champions of adherence to the Constitution’s separagovernmental actor must defend its actions by finding
tion of powers scheme.
an authorizing grant of power to that actor and by showJustice Scalia dissented in Mistretta, but on a technical
ing that the terms of the grant encompass the act in
ground that cannot be generalized to most settings. He
question. Only if such a grant is found would one need
agreed with the majority’s basic conclusion that courts
to see if there is a provision that affirmatively prohibits
should not try to police the extent to which Congress
the government from acting in the particular case. In the
vests discretion in administrative agencies, reasoning
context of the nondelegation doctrine, the relevant questhat “while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is
tion is whether the delegating institution has the enuunquestionably a fundamental element of our constitumerated power to execute the delegation and the receivtional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by
ing institution has the enumerated power to exercise the
the courts.” Clearly, there is work to be done.
assigned authority.
Of course, to show that a practice is identifiably
Because most delegation issues concern attempts by
unconstitutional is not to show, as a matter of political
Congress to empower executive actors, I will focus on
theory, that it ought to be abandoned. After all, the northat aspect of delegation, although I will put aside for the
mative force of the Constitution is hardly self-evident. But
moment problems posed by Congress’s attempts to give
neither is it self-evident that the Constitution should be
administrative agencies power that is beyond the control
irrelevant to modern concerns. Even those who doubt
of the president. Such attempts raise constitutional issues
the binding force of the Constitution ignore at their peril
beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that the
the wisdom of the founding generation. At a minimum, if
Constitution, properly understood, requires the presiwe are going to cast the Constitution aside, we at least
dent to control all exercises of executive power, regardought to know what we have rejected.
less of where Congress tries to vest that power. Although
the practice of government is often inconsistent with that
DELEGATION AND ENUMERATED POWERS
understanding, I will assume here, primarily for ease of
the constitution contains many provisions that
exposition, that all attempted delegations are directly to
deal with the separation of powers. The Constitution vests
the president.
nation is wrong and the Constitution is right. My task in
this essay is more modest. I aim to establish two propositions: first, that the Constitution prohibits the kind of
delegation of legislative authority that is at the heart of
modern administrative governance and, second, that
courts, legislators, and presidents are capable of identifying unconstitutional delegations if they put their minds
to the task.
If these propositions seem trivial, that appearance
is deceptive. The first proposition is a subject of considerable academic controversy, and even those who
assert the existence of a nondelegation principle typically have a hard time identifying the constitutional
source and contours of that principle. As for the sec-
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fidence that the essence of the executive power is carryunder the principle of enumerated powers, any
ing into effect—executing, if you will—the laws of the
action by the president must fall (either directly or by
nation. The Constitution grants the president the power
implication) within a grant of power to the president in
to execute the laws but not to make or enact a law.
the Constitution. The Constitution grants to the presiThe problem is defining where execution ends and
dent a number of specific powers, such as the power to
enactment begins. Execution is not a mechanical task. It
sign or veto legislation, to make treaties and appointinvolves more than a dotting of “i”s and a crossing of
ments subject to Senate approval, and to adjourn Con“t”s. Execution requires judgment in the allocation of
gress when the House and Senate cannot agree on a
resources, in the choice of means, and in the interpretatime of adjournment. The opening sentence of Article
tion of laws that can never be entirely without ambiguiII further provides: “The executive Power shall be vestty. In 1789, not every exercise of discretion by the presed in a President of the United States of America.” It is
ident would have been considered an unconstitutional
clear (though many academics work hard to resist the
exercise of legislative power. The meaning of “executive
obvious) that the sentence is a grant of power. But
power” is broad enough to include some measure of disexactly what power does it grant?
The Constitution does not tell us.
The Constitution identifies
three distinct governmental powWhenever the president claims to be exercising execers—legislative, executive, and
judicial—but never defines them
utive power, the question is whether he is executing
or their respective boundaries. The
the law or engaging in some other activity that is not
Founders were fully aware that
they did not precisely define the
within the meaning of “executive power.”
legislative, executive, and judicial
powers because they knew they
could not. As James Madison candidly wrote in The Federalist:
cretion—and even some measure of interpretative freeExperience has instructed us that no skill in the scidom in the face of statutes of less than perfect clarity.
ence of government has yet been able to discrimiThus, whenever the president claims to be acting
nate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
under the general grant of executive power, the question
great provinces—the legislative, executive, and
is, quite simply, whether he is executing the law or engagjudiciary…. Questions daily occur in the course of
ing in some other activity that is not encompassed withpractice which prove the obscurity which reigns in
in the meaning of “executive power.”
these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest
EXECUTION VERSUS LAWMAKING

adepts in political science.

The absence (or impossibility) of a precise definition
of executive power does not mean that there are no
boundaries between the three governmental powers. The
Constitution plainly assumes such boundaries by vesting
different powers in the different institutions. And Madison showed elsewhere in The Federalist that he did not
regard the difficulty of drawing boundaries as a reason
for avoiding the task altogether.
The fact that the executive power granted by the first
sentence of Article II is general does not make it limitless
or undefinable. It is clear, for instance, that the executive
power does not include the power to adjudicate the guilt
of a criminal defendant and impose a sentence. No one in
1789 would have had any trouble placing that task
squarely outside any plausible understanding of “executive power.” Nor does the executive power include the
power to enact a tax code in the absence of congressional action or the power to regulate a sphere of activity
without statutory authorization.
Although the precise contours of the executive power
remain a mystery even today, we can say with some conRegulation

ARE THERE LIMITS ON WHAT CONGRESS
MAY DELEGATE?

the principle of enumerated powers generally
prevents the president from acting unilaterally without
congressional authorization. But suppose Congress gives
such authorization. Is there a limit to the authority that
Congress can properly vest in the president by statute?
That, in a nutshell, is the nondelegation problem.
Suppose, for example, Congress enacts a statute stating “The president is empowered to promulgate rules
concerning the regulation of commerce among the several states.” The imaginary statute further provides penalties for violations of presidential rules issued pursuant to
the statute but does not limit the content (as opposed to
the subject matter) of the president’s rules. Is the statute
constitutional?
There would seem to be no problem from the president’s perspective. The essence of the executive power is
the execution of the laws, and our imaginary law specifically authorizes the president to promulgate rules as he
sees fit. Presidential rulemaking in this case would thus
seem to be a plain instance of executing a clear congres25 Vo l u m e 22 , N o . 2

sional directive. What could be more consistent with the
Constitution’s formal scheme of separated powers than
presidential implementation of a duly enacted congressional statute?
It is certain, however, that in 1789 everyone would
have regarded such unconstrained presidential rulemaking as unconstitutional. It is equally clear that no constitutional provision expressly governs the form of congressional statutes. The scheme of enumerated powers limits
the range of subjects within the competence of Congress,
and Article I, section 7, prescribes the procedure that lawmaking must follow. But if a statute is enacted in compliance with the necessary procedural formalities and its
subject matter is limited to the range of subjects placed

which gives Congress power to “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof.” Presidential rulemaking is a means of implementing or executing the congressional commerce power; it is not a direct exercise of
that power.
THE SWEEPING CLAUSE LIMITS CONGRESS’S
POWER TO DELEGATE
The Clause Has Limited Breadth Does the sweeping clause

sweep broadly enough to permit Congress to grant
broad rulemaking power to the president? The answer is
unequivocally “no.” The sweeping
clause permits Congress to enact
implementing (or executory) laws
only if those laws are “necessary and
Congress could not, and cannot, implement
proper” for effectuating federal
powers. Whether or not our imagits enumerated powers in ways that
inary statute is “necessary,” as the
exceed the “proper” bounds of federalism and
Constitution uses that term, it is
clear that such a statute would not
the separation of powers.
be “proper.”
Although the word “proper” in
the sweeping clause was largely
ignored for more than two cenwithin Congress’s jurisdiction, what is the constitutional
turies, a careful study of the term in its constitutional
problem? It is one thing to invoke the intentions of the
context shows that congressional statutes under the
framing generation. It is quite another thing to show that
sweeping clause must conform to background norms of
those intentions were in fact realized through a textually
federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. I
embodied mechanism.
have elsewhere developed that argument at length, in colThe framing generation did indeed codify the nonlaboration with Patricia B. Granger, and in 1997 the
delegation principle in the Constitution, but it did so
Supreme Court endorsed the argument, in the context of
through a mechanism that has gone largely unnoticed
federalism (Printz v. United States).
for two centuries. We must always remember to ask the
The understanding that congressional statutes
right question: What is the source of Congress’s power
under the sweeping clause must conform to certain
to pass a statute?
background norms has broad ramifications. For
Our imaginary statute authorizing the president to
instance, in 1789—even before the ratification of the
promulgate rules regulating commerce could not properly
Bill of Rights—it would not have been “proper” for
be authorized by the clause in the Constitution giving
Congress to authorize enforcement of the tax laws
Congress the power to “regulate Commerce… among
through the issuance of general warrants, the imposithe several States.” The statute is not a regulation of
tion of prior restraints on anti-tax protests, and the
commerce and, therefore, is not an exercise of the concommencement of criminal proceedings on informagressional power to regulate commerce. If Congress
tion rather than indictment. (The Bill of Rights mainpassed a statute that, for example, limited the ability of
ly confirmed the limitations on governmental power
one state to exclude from its borders the goods of other
inherent in the Constitution’s scheme of enumerated
states, that act would constitute a regulation of interpowers.) Similarly, Congress could not, and cannot,
state commerce. But a bare authorization to the presiimplement its enumerated powers in ways that exceed
dent to promulgate such rules is not itself a statute regthe “proper” bounds of federalism and the separation
ulating commerce within the meaning of the commerce
of powers. In 1789, two things would have been plain:
clause—no more than is a statute appropriating funds
A law that simply authorized the president to promulto the United States Marshal Service for the execution of
gate rules without any further structure would not be
judgments in cases involving commercial regulations.
“proper”; thus such a law would not be among the
Rather, such laws must be justified by reference to the
enumerated powers of Congress.
Problems Solved Identifying the sweeping clause (and the
so-called “sweeping clause” (or, as we have come to misprinciple of enumerated powers) as the source of the
label it, the “necessary and proper clause”) of Article I,
Regulation
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Constitution’s nondelegation principle solves at least two
ly consistent with a “proper” allocation of governmental
problems that have plagued delegation theorists. First, it
powers as that would have been understood in 1789. How
becomes clear that the nondelegation doctrine is textualcan we tell when a statute vests so much discretion in the
ly grounded. It is not impossible, of course, for a principle
president that it crosses the line between a “proper”
as important as the nondelegation doctrine to exist solemeans of implementing a federal power and an “improply as an implied background norm, but it is more comer” delegation of legislative authority?
forting to find it in the constitutional text.
IDENTIFYING DELEGATIONS
Second, the source of the nondelegation doctrine
Line-Drawing Problems The word “proper” may seem a
points to limits on the doctrine. In some contexts, Conslight foundation for a constitutional doctrine. How
gress is free to act as a general legislature, without
much executive discretion is too much? Is it a function
regard to the Constitution’s normal rules of enumerated
purely of the degree of discretion? Or does the kind of dispowers. For instance, when Congress is managing fedcretion enter into the picture? Can “too much” discretion
eral property or administering federal territories or the
in the context of one statute be “just enough” discretion in
District of Columbia, the Constitution grants Congress,
within those limited spheres, general legislative authority. That is,
when it legislates on such subjects, Congress need not rely on
A statute whose formal “execution” by the executhe authority of the sweeping
clause to pass implementing legistive would make the executive a lawmaker would
lation; the relevant grants of
be an “improper” allocation of authority between
power directly authorize necessary congressional action.
the legislative and executive departments.
The preceding analysis explains
how Congress, from the time of the
founding, could create territorial
legislatures rather than govern terthe context of another statute? These and similar probritories directly. Advocates of the nondelegation doctrine
lems have prompted most observers, including Justice
would otherwise be led inexorably to the conclusion that
Scalia, to conclude that even if the Constitution contains a
territorial legislatures are unconstitutional, which is an
nondelegation doctrine, there is no principled way to give
awkward and improbable (even if not completely imposit content, and it must therefore go unenforced.
sible) conclusion. Moreover, Congress traditionally has
Line-drawing problems, however, are ubiquitous in
given the executive very broad discretion to manage fedconstitutional law. Such problems have not, in other coneral property. The idea that the Constitution requires Contexts, deterred line drawing by either court or academy.
gress to micromanage the one-third of the nation’s land
Neither should we abandon the enterprise of fashioning a
mass that is owned by the federal government is highly
nondelegation doctrine without a little effort.
improbable. Because Congress does not need the sweepI will not canvas here the Supreme Court’s efforts
ing clause to legislate about federal property, it is simply
over two centuries to wrestle with the nondelegation
not bound by the nondelegation doctrine’s constraints in
problem, but it is instructive to look at the Court’s first
that sphere.
extended treatment of the subject. Chief Justice John
The Sweeping Clause and “Executive Power” All of which
Marshall, writing in 1825 in Wayman v. Southard, observed
leaves the big question: Given that the sweeping clause,
in a lengthy dictum on the nondelegation doctrine:
with its requirement that executory laws be “proper,” limThe line has not been exactly drawn which sepaits the form and content of congressional statutes that
rates those important subjects, which must be
seek to implement the various powers granted to federal
entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those
actors, what are those limits? Here our understanding of
of less interest, in which a general provision may be
the executive power can help.
made, and power given to those who are to act
An 18th Century audience would have understood the
under such general provisions to fill up the details.
substantive difference between legislative and executive
Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation of the nondelepower. A statute whose formal “execution” by the execugation principle seems to send us in a circle: The Constitive would effectively make the executive a lawmaker
tution requires Congress to make whatever decisions are
would have been understood as an “improper” allocation
important enough in the statutory context at issue so
of authority between the legislative and executive departthat the Constitution requires Congress to make them. A
ments, an allocation unauthorized by the sweeping
distinction between subjects that are “important” and
clause. But it is clear from our analysis of the executive
those that are of “less interest” does not seem much of an
power that some measure of executive discretion is entireRegulation
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improvement over the word “proper.” Perhaps we need to
look a bit further.
A TALE OF THREE FORMULATIONS

three modern scholars have proposed formulations for a judicially manageable nondelegation principle.
Professor David Schoenbrod’s principle is that a
statute’s constitutionality generally depends on its ability
to resolve cases brought under it. As Professor Schoenbrod states it,
a person interested in knowing whether the statute
prohibits any given conduct will, in most cases, get
a clear answer from the statute that states the law,
but may well get no answer, for any particular case,
from a statute that delegates.

not address every choice conceivably embodied in a
statute but only those choices that bear closely on the
types of political responsibility contemplated by our
scheme of representative government. How can we tell
whether an issue bears enough on expectations of
accountability in our representative scheme to require
congressional resolution? Presumably, issues that meet
the requirement will pertain to matters that are “important” to an informed electorate under the statute rather
than matters of “less interest”—which sends us back
again to Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation.
Or, at least, it sends us to a corollary of Marshall’s formulation. For Professor Redish, the importance of an
issue is determined by reference to its capacity to inform
voters about their representatives’ positions. Chief Justice
Marshall did not tell us what he meant by “important

Professor Schoenbrod’s formulation may not seem precise, but it
captures a central truth about delegations: A statute that does not
A statute that entrusts to the president so much
itself establish rules of law but simply provides a mechanism by
discretion in an important matter that the statute
which some other entity can estabitself does not resolve the matter is not a “proper”
lish rules of law is probably an
unconstitutional delegation.
statute and is therefore unconstitutional.
But is a statute’s case-resolving
power the proper focus? Do we
care only about the number of cases
resolved under a statute or do we
also care about the kind or character of the cases that a
subjects,” but his meaning probably had more to do with
statute resolves? If a statute handles many details with
the type of subject than with the electorate’s perceptions
precision but leaves (let us say) the two most important
of it. In practice, Professor Redish’s and Chief Justice Marpolicy questions for the executive to resolve, is it really a
shall’s tests are likely to converge in most (important?)
“proper” law? Perhaps it is less permissible for Congress
cases, and both tests in turn will overlap considerably
to pass the buck on “important” matters than on matters
with Professor Schoenbrod’s.
of “less interest”—which sends us right back to Chief JusRESOLVING THE NONDELEGATION PUZZLE
tice Marshall’s 1825 answer.
i have previously proposed a third formulation
Professor Martin Redish has proposed a thoughtful
for the Constitution’s nondelegation principle: “Congress
and powerful test for delegations, which he calls the
must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently
“political commitment principle.” As Professor Redish
important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Conexplains it,
gress must make them.” In other words, to save us the
accountability for lawmakers constitutes the sine
trouble of reaching Chief Justice Marshall’s test indirectly,
qua non of a representative democracy. It thereI simply leap to it directly.
fore seems reasonable to demand as the prereqMarshall was right. The propriety of a delegation in a
uisite for legislative action some meaningful level
specific
issue depends on the degree of discretion granted
of normative political commitment by the enacting
the president and the importance of the issue to the statulegislators, thus enabling the electorate to judge
tory scheme. Congress must make the central, fundaits representatives…. A reviewing court will be
mental decisions in each statutory scheme, but Congress
able to determine whether the necessary political
can leave the details to others (be it the president or the
commitment has been made by deciding whether
courts) to fill in. Whether an issue is central or fundathe voters would be better informed about their
mental must be determined in the context of each specifrepresentatives’ positions by learning how their
ic statutory scheme. A statute that entrusts to the presirepresentatives voted on the statute.
dent so much discretion in an important matter that the
Professor Redish’s test, unlike Professor Schoenstatute itself does not resolve the matter is not a “proper”
brod’s, explicitly focuses on the significance of the issues
statute for carrying into effect federal powers and is
involved. Professor Redish’s nondelegation doctrine does
therefore unconstitutional.
Regulation
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Of course, in applying the last test one is well advised
to draw on the insights of Professors Redish and Schoenbrod, as well, because all of the tests converge over a
broad range of cases.
We are still left with the central question: How do we
tell in any given case whether there is too much discretion on too important a subject? Chief Justice Marshall
again had the answer:
The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive
executes, and the judiciary construes the law; but
the maker of the law may commit something to the
discretion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate
and difficult inquiry.

In other words, that is why judges get paid. Brightline rules are nice, but the Constitution does not always
cooperate by prescribing them. Line-drawing without
algorithmic guidance is an inescapable feature of the law.
One could write a book chapter (and I am planning one)
on the resulting hard cases. But one could also write a
book chapter (and I am planning one) on the easy kills
that dot the pages of the United States Code.
The Communications Act instructs the Federal Communications Commission to grant broadcast licenses “if
public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served
thereby.” The statute grants nearly absolute discretion
about a subject that is absolutely central to the regulation
of broadcasting. (Easy kill number 1.) The Motor Vehicle
Safety Act states that “the Secretary of Transportation
shall prescribe motor vehicle safety standards. Each standard shall be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle
safety, and be stated in objective terms.” Again, the
statute says nothing; the agency’s discretion is nearly
absolute and the statute makes no decision except to have
a scheme of motor vehicle safety standards. (Easy kill
number 2.)

A good percentage of the key statutes in the modern
administrative state flagrantly violate the Constitution’s
nondelegation principle. In our political culture, that is
not a decisive normative argument against them. But it
ought to count for something.
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